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1Fair and Equitable Treatment Between the International and National Rule of Law 
Abstract 
Promoting the rule of law is a potentially strong legitimating narrative for international 
investment law. Illustrating the interlinkage, the ubiquitous ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
(FET) standard embodies distinctly rule of law requirements. But these requirements remain 
open-textured and allow understanding their meaning in either more ‘international’ or 
‘national’ way. An ‘international’ understanding – detached from the host State’s vision on 
how the rule of law should look like - should remain dominant. But I argue that decision-
making under the FET standard should also involve a systematic engagement with how these 
requirements would be understood in the host State law and how they were complied with 
from that perspective. Whilst not determinative for establishing a breach, this assessment 
better respects the expectations of the parties, strengthens the persuasiveness of findings and 
helps enhance the national rule of law as a key contributor to the ultimate goal of investment 
protection - economic development. 
Keywords 
fair and equitable treatment - international investment law – investor-State dispute settlement 
- rule of law
1 Introduction 
The story of international investment law (IIL) is remarkable in many ways. Arising out of 
the sometimes-alleged thousands of years of efforts to secure the property and peaceful 
operation of business people abroad, it has towards the end of the XX century become one of 
the fastest growing and most controversial spheres of international law. The assessments of 
the IIL regime and investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) vary from them being ‘one of the 
most progressive developments in international law and relations in the history of 
international law’1 to conclusions that IIL ‘has ensnared hundreds of countries and put 
1 Stephen M Schwebel, ‘The Outlook for the Continued Vitality, or Lack Thereof, of Investor–State Arbitration’ 
(2016) 32 ArbIntl 1, 1. 
2corporate profit before human rights and the environment.’2 Between and beyond these poles 
lies the regime’s quest to fully define its role and its value to host States and foreign 
investors. 
In that quest, jurisprudence and literature have given a prominent place to the professed 
aim of securing the rule of law for foreign investors and promoting it more generally in the 
host States through enforcing ‘supranational rule of law … [and] … uniform standards for 
acceptable sovereign behavior.’3 This article takes both a descriptive and prescriptive look at 
the interlinkage between the predominantly used IIL standard of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ and the rule of law. Due to its inherent appeal, the concept of the rule of law has a 
great legitimating potential for IIL.4 In that sense, the jurisprudence-led conceptualisation of 
the FET standard as containing distinctly rule of law requirements is neither surprising, nor 
problematic by itself. But IIL jurisprudence and literature also reveal a strong predilection for 
understanding and applying these requirements in an ‘international’ way that does not 
necessarily, if at all, take into account what these same requirements would mean in the legal 
order of the host State in question. This might appear logical in light of the international legal 
character of the FET standard. But even these ‘distilled’ FET requirements remain 
considerably vague, which is only augmented by a lack of firm, more detailed ‘international’ 
reference points as to what they might mean. Where should one turn to find out what (e.g.) 
‘transparent’ means in the international context, and as applicable to the operation of 
domestic administration? The open-textured nature of the used notions risks a somewhat 
impressionistic ‘I know it when I see it’ way of legal reasoning,5 which is concerning in light 
of the potentially record-setting damages awards that can come as a result. 
2 Pia Eberhardt and Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are 
Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom (Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute 2012) 
7. 
3 David W Rivkin, ‘The Impact of International Arbitration on the Rule of Law’ (2013) 29 ArbIntl 327, 328. See 
also in that sense Benjamin K Guthrie, ‘Beyond Investment Protection: An Examination of the Potential 
Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law’ (2012-2013) 45 NYUJIntlL&Pol 1151, 1167 and 
authors cited in Thomas Schultz and Cedric Dupont, ‘Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or 
Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study’ (2015) 25 EJIL 1147, 1164.
4 To note, defining ‘legitimacy’ is a complex exercise. For the purposes of this article, it is understood, firstly, in 
Thomas Franck’s sense of ‘perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed’ in order to secure 
compliance (Thomas M Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 AJIL 705, 706). This 
perception of legitimacy would here come about from what Chris Thomas has termed ‘substantive’ legitimacy 
(Chris A Thomas, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’ (2014) 34 OJLS 729, 751). 
Substantive legitimacy would mean decision-making that is in line with the shared values of those to whom the 
decision is addressed (ibid), this value here being the rule of law. 
5 See in that sense, and in connection with denial of justice jurisprudence in international law, Andrea K 
Bjorklund, ‘Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims’ (2005) 45 
VaJIntlL 809, 814. 
3I put forward a normative argument that for the purposes of establishing a breach of the 
FET standard the ‘international’ understanding of the rule of law requirements (here dubbed 
the IROL paradigm) should be thoroughly and systematically complemented in the decision-
making process by the ‘national’ rule of law (NROL) paradigm.6 This would entail engaging 
with how the domestic legal order would understand those same requirements, and through 
assessment to what extent the host State followed its own rule of law ‘vision’ in dealing with 
the foreign investor. Although this more holistic assessment of domestic legality would not 
be determinative, nor make national law substantively applicable, it would help remedy the 
concerns about the legal reasoning process, as well as help realize other benefits in line with 
the broader goals of IIL. More specifically, there are three main reasons to opt for this 
complementation.  
Firstly, it would help prevent the disconnect between the pre-dispute legal framework that 
was expected to be primarily relevant for the investment (which is the national one) and the 
post-dispute (IIL) one. Secondly, it would help enhance the persuasiveness of the legal 
reasoning process and its findings. Arbitrators’ determinations as to what is (e.g.) ‘due 
process’ compliant or ‘transparent’ can only benefit from engaging with the pre-existing, 
usually more detailed and presumably already domestically internalized provisions of 
municipal law. Finally, persuasively identifying and elucidating the potential rule of law 
failures (also) from the perspective of the host State’s own legal system, can provide 
guidance for legislative, policy or practice reform so as to avoid future disputes and allow 
rule of law enhancement for a broader spectrum of stakeholders. Such improvement can help 
economic development, and thus realise the ultimate goal of host State participation in the IIL 
regime. 
The article proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the widespread 
appeal of the concept of the rule of law and its instrumental connection to attracting 
investment. Section 3 examines the existing link between the IIL regime and the narrative of 
rule of law promotion, in particular through the ubiquitously present FET standard. 
Following thereon, section 4 presents the IROL and NROL paradigms as ways of thinking 
about how the FET-embodied rule of law requirements could be understood and applied, and 
discusses the current predominance of the IROL paradigm in jurisprudence and literature. 
Section 5 puts forward the main normative argument of IROL and NROL complementation, 
6 The arguments put forward do not address the damages determinations (if these become relevant), although 
rule of law considerations may certainly have impact on quantum as well. 
4and discusses in more detail the three above-mentioned reasons for it. Finally, section 6 
analyses Dan Cake v Hungary award7 as a feasibility case study that illustrates the thorough 
engagement with the national legal order in a way that can enhance the domestic rule of law. 
Section 7 offers some concluding thoughts.  
2 The Charmed Concept of the ‘Rule of Law’ and its Instrumental Side 
Lawyers, economists and businesspeople all seem united (for once) in their appreciation for 
the rule of law. Strong rule of law has been consistently considered a key condition for the 
growth of commerce8 and investment,9 as well as for economic development in general.10
While there are some significant caveats,11 the importance of the rule of law for economic 
development is almost axiomatic in most economic circles, followed closely by the legal 
ones.12
More generally, there is a long history of discussing and promoting the concept of the rule 
of law (in its somewhat different versions) in common and continental law jurisdictions.13
Whilst the definition and content of the notion remain unsettled, its broad appeal is hardly in 
question – rule of law has been described as a ‘charmed concept, essentially without critics or 
dissenters.’14 Various proclamations at the international level illustrate this charm, despite (or 
7 Dan Cake (Portugal) S.A. v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/12/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Liability (24 August 2015). 
8 Thomas Hale, Between Interests and Law: The Politics of Transnational Commercial Disputes (CUP 2016) 3. 
9 Guthrie (n 3) 1159 and materials cited in fn 33. 
10 Alvaro Santos, ‘World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" Promise in Economic Development’ in David 
Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 
253, 253; Robert C Allen, Global Economic History – A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2011) 15. 
11 See on caution regarding the measurement problems and actual effects of the rule of law Santos (n 10) 283-85 
and N Jansen Calamita, ‘The Rule of Law, Investment Treaties, and Economic Growth: Mapping Normative 
and Empirical Questions’ in Jeffrey Jowell, J Christopher Thomas and Jan van Zyl Smit (eds), Rule of Law 
Symposium 2014 (Singapore Academy of Law 2015) 120-21. 
12 Santos (n 10) 253; Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd 
ed, OUP 2012) 25; Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (CUP 2004) 2. Empirical 
economic studies likewise tend to support concrete links between the rule of law and higher economic 
development, on which see, for example, Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Franceso Trebbi, ‘Institutions 
Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development’ (2004) 9 The 
Journal of Economic Growth 131; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A Robinson, ‘Institutions as the 
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth’ in Philippe Aghion and Steven N Durlauf (eds), Handbook of 
Economic Growth, Volume 1A (Elsevier 2005).
13 For an overview, see primarily Tamanaha (n 12). This is not to say that the concept is unknown in other legal 
families as well. See for example Timur Kuran, ‘The Rule of Law in Islamic Thought and Practice: A Historical 
Perspective’ in James J Heckman, Robert L Nelson and Lee Cabatingan (eds), Global Perspectives on the Rule 
of Law (Routledge 2010) 71-89. 
14 Ian Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law: Law and the Limit of Politics’ (2014) 28 Ethics & International 
Affairs 39, 39. See similarly for the universal appeal of the concept Arthur Watts, ‘The International Rule of 
Law’ (1993) 36 GYIL 15, 15-16 and Robert McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of Law: Defying 
5perhaps because of) a considerable dose of vagueness as to what is exactly meant by the term. 
States and international organizations profess to spare no efforts in promoting the rule of law 
at the ‘national and international levels’15 and reaffirm that ‘respect for and promotion of the 
rule of law and justice should guide all [States’ and international organizations’] activities 
and accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions.’16 Despite recent failures to fully 
define the concept at the UN level,17 the underlying common understanding about its 
desirability persists. 
Those same international proclamations sometimes specifically recognise the link between 
the rule of law and investment attraction. As noted in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome, 
there is a need for continuing efforts of developing States and States in transition 
to create a domestic environment conducive to attracting investments through, inter alia, 
achieving a transparent, stable and predictable investment climate with proper contract 
enforcement and respect for property rights and the rule of law …18
The quote above chimes well with a body of literature putting forward the ‘conventional 
wisdom’19 that domestic rule of law is essential for attracting foreign direct investments 
(FDI).20 For example, UNCTAD notes that, for attracting FDI, ‘[t]he creation of 
participatory, transparent and accountable governance systems that promote and enforce the 
rule of law is critical […]’.21 Lawyers, including those involved with international investment 
law, tend to share these sentiments.22 Apart from its intrinsic value as an ‘unqualified human 
Gravity?’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 277, 278. See, however, for a description of the consensus as ‘fraudulent’ in light of 
widespread rule of law defects worldwide Jan Paulsson, ‘Enclaves of Justice’, Miami Law Research Paper 
Series 2010-29, 1. 
15 See prominently the UNGA Resolution 64/116 - The rule of law at the national and international levels 
(A/RES/64/116). 
16 UNGA Resolution 67/1 - Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law 
at the National and International Levels (A/RES/67/1) para 2. See for regional proclamations Helmut P Aust and 
Georg Nolte, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law at the National Level’ in Michael Zürn, Andre 
Nollkaemper and Randy Peerenboom (eds), Rule of Law Dynamics in an Era of International and 
Transnational Governance (CUP 2014) 48, 57. 
17 See on this Nora Arajärvi, ‘The Rule of Law in the 2030 Agenda’ (2018) 10 HJRL 187. 
18 2005 World Summit Outcome document (A/RES/60/1) para 25 (a). 
19 John Hewko, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter?’, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Working Paper Number 26, April 2002, 3.  
20 See generally for a recent empirical assessment that tends to support the importance of the domestic rule of 
law British Institute of International and Comparative Law/Hogan Lovells, Risk and Return: Foreign Direct 
Investment and the Rule of Law (BIICL 2015). 
21 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge
(UNCTAD 2008) 150. See similarly earlier UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for 
Development: National and International Perspectives (UNCTAD 2003) 86.  
22 For Jeffrey Jowell, ‘investment will shirk countries which do not honour contracts or property rights, or which 
tax retrospectively or discriminate or intimidate selected firms or individuals without any hope of recourse’ 
(‘The Rule of Law: A Practical and Universal Concept’ in Jeffrey Jowell, J Christopher Thomas, Jan van Zyl 
6good’,23 the rule of law thus also becomes a more pragmatic tool, a factor of considerable 
relevance for achieving increased investment flows and the (presumably linked) economic 
development. 
3 IIL and the Rule of Law  
3.1. The Narrative of the Investment Regime as a Rule of Law Enhancer 
In light of the above, it is hardly surprising that the narrative of securing and promoting the 
rule of law has taken a prominent place in legitimising the existence and operation of the IIL 
regime. Initially, the existence of strong international investment protection was supposed to 
be (primarily)24 legitimised through the practical benefits – concluded international 
investment agreements (hereinafter also IIAs) would directly result in increased FDI.25 States 
would guarantee protection to foreign investors and set their minds at ease when venturing 
into a potentially risky environment, bringing their capital with them. As written by Paul 
Proehl as early as 1960, once a ‘sound and stable way of doing business’ (i.e. a Western one) 
is secured through investment protection, the ‘great strides’ of investment and economic 
development can finally happen.26
But empirically demonstrating the link between IIAs and increased foreign investment 
levels has proved elusive. Without delving deeper into this complex area, it suffices to note 
that decades of empirical research have failed to provide a consensus.27 Overall, the studies 
cannot sufficiently persuasively or consistently show the causal link or even correlation 
Smit (eds), Rule of Law Symposium 2014 (Singapore Academy of Law 2015) 3, 9). See similarly Jeswald W 
Salacuse, ‘Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in Developing Countries’ (2000) 15 ICSID Rev-FILJ 382, 
386-87 and 398. 
23 As famously termed by E. P. Thompson in Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Pantheon Books 
1975) 266. 
24 Another justificatory narrative is the ‘de-politicization’ of disputes that investor-State arbitration allows (see 
Ibrahim Shihata, ‘Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA’ 
(1986) 1 ICSID Rev-FILJ 1). Although still present, this narrative is itself problematic as the true extent of de-
politicization between the involved home and host States has been questioned both at the theoretical level 
(Martins Paparinskis, ‘The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration’ in James 
Crawford and Sarah Nouwen (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law – Vol.3 
(Hart 2012)) and recently also empirically (Geoffrey Gertz, Srividya Jandhyala and Lauge N Skovgaard 
Poulsen, ‘Legalization, Diplomacy and Development: Do Investment Treaties De-politicize Investment 
Disputes?’ GEG Working Paper 137, March 2018). 
25 See Andrew T Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38 VaJIntlL 639 for a prominent argument in that vein, coming also from the 
heyday of intensive 1990s IIA conclusion. 
26 Paul O Proehl, ‘Private Investments Abroad’ (1960) 9 JPubL 362, 364. 
27 For a recent and comprehensive overview of the research on this topic, see Jason Bonnitcha, Lauge N 
Skovgaard Poulsen and Michael Waibel, The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime (OUP 2017) 
ch 6. 
7between IIAs and the increased FDI flows.28 Empirical studies finding correlations,29 are 
countered by those that find no30 or weak correlation,31 coupled with studies indicating that 
IIAs simply form one part of the overall investment attraction environment32 or that 
specificities of a particular economic sector actually play a more important role in FDI 
attraction.33 Increase in the ‘strength’ of IIA provisions also does not seem to be associated 
with increased investment.34
At the same time, the potential costs of participating in the investment regime are 
considerable. Adverse investment awards can rip into the ‘social fabric’ of the host State,35 or 
be economically ‘impossible to bear.’36 How can then the continuing existence of IIL be 
justified? Focusing on the rule of law, as opposed to FDI number crunching, provides an 
alternative (and less measurable) avenue. As recently argued by Mavluda Sattorova, both the 
IIAs and the investor-State arbitration have been increasingly touted as ‘catalysts of 
governance reforms in host States, providing the investment treaty regime with another raison 
d’etre and justifying its recent strides.’37 Surveying the literature tends to confirm the strong 
narrative of IIL’s ‘mission’ to secure the rule of law and/or good governance.38 Investment 
28 For a good overview see generally Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign 
Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (OUP 2009). 
29 Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to 
Developing Countries?’ (2005) 33 World Development 1567; Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do 
BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 
HarvIntlLJ 67. 
30 Mary Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a bit…and they could bite’, 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 3121, 2003. 
31 Jason W Yackee, ‘Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2008) 
BrookJIntlL 405. 
32 UNCTAD, The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to 
Developing Countries (UNCTAD 2009) xi-xii; Susan Rose-Ackerman and Jennifer L Tobin, ‘Do BITs Benefit 
Developing Countries?’ in Catherine A Rogers and Roger P Alford (eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration
(OUP 2009). 
33 Emma Aisbett, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation and Causation’ in 
Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (OUP 2009). 
34 Jason W Yackee, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: 
Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?’ (2008) 42 L&Soc’yRev 805, 807.
35 Stephan W Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law – An Introduction’ in Stephan 
W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 3, 16. 
36 Hélène Ruiz Fabri, ‘Regulating Trade, Investment and Money’ in James Crawford and Marti Koskenniemi 
(eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (CUP 2012) 352, 361. 
37 Mavluda Sattorova, The Impact of Investment Treaty Law on Host States: Enabling Good Governance? (Hart 
2018) 9. 
38 As Van Harten notes, ‘rule of law-based advocacy is widespread in academic, practitioner, policy, and 
popular literature on investment arbitration’ (Gus Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural 
Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public 
Law (OUP 2010) 627, 627 and materials cited therein). See also, among many others, Guthrie (n 3) 1160 (‘BITs 
are a method of ensuring that foreign investment is treated in accordance with the rule of law’); Bjorklund (n 5) 
882; José E Alvarez, ‘‘‘Beware: Boundary Crossings’’ – A Critical Appraisal of Public Law Approaches to 
International Investment Law’ (2016) 17 JWIT 171, 227 (‘of course, the investment regime is intended to 
8agreements are ‘necessary’ as the pre-existing legal framework is seen as insufficient - 
securing the rule of law is thus a primary function of an investment treaty.39
To offer some further illustrations, James Crawford notes that the role of IIL is on 
occasion not just to reinforce but actually ‘institute’ the rule of law - absence of arbitrary 
conduct, judicial independence and non-retrospectivity are all ‘standards’ of the rule of law 
present in IIAs so to potentially discipline a host State.40 More generally, the States are 
required to ‘conform their behaviour to rule of law standards that enable market forces to 
unfold’41 and should not be allowed to ‘misregulate’.42 As the ADC v Hungary tribunal 
emphasised, ‘while a sovereign State possesses the inherent right to regulate its domestic 
affairs, the exercise of such right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries. … [T]he rule 
of law, which includes [IIA] obligations, provides such boundaries.’43
To sum up, the actual increase of FDI may prove to be uncertain, but this should be 
compensated (at least in legitimacy terms) by the role that investment law and ISDS have in 
securing the universally appealing ideal of the rule of law.44 This is, after all, an ideal whose 
realisation should eventually help attract investments in any case. To be clear, my argument 
here is not that the recourse to the rule of law is some sort of a concerted justificatory effort 
by those involved with (or supportive of) IIL so to maintain the regime at any cost.45 It is 
rather a recognition that for a variety of reasons – such as attitudes of arbitrators and counsel, 
compel governments to respect the rule of law …’); and Calamita (n 11) 122; for IIA negotiators espousing such 
views see Joachim Steffens, ‘Expectations of Governments and Investors vs. Practice: The Government View 
on BITs’ (2009) 24 ICSID Rev-FILJ 347, 348.  
39 Guthrie (n 3) 1166. See similarly Federico Ortino, ‘The Investment Treaty System as Judicial Review’ (2013) 
24 AmRevIntlArb 437, 443 (‘the principle of the rule of law [provides] a normative justification for investment 
treaties’) and Calamita (n 11) 122 (‘a frequently recited aspect … is that a principal purpose of international 
investment treaties is to serve as an internationalised substitute for the domestic legal systems of host states in 
which the place of the rule of law … may be unreliable or uncertain.’). 
40 James Crawford, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 24 AdelLRev 3, 7-8. See similarly Rudolf 
Dolzer, ‘The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law’ (2004-2005) 37 
NYUJIntlL&Pol 953, 953-54 and Charles T Kotuby Jr and Luke A Sobota, ‘Practical Suggestions to Promote 
the Legitimacy and Vitality of International Investment Arbitration’ (2013) 28 ICSID Rev-FILJ 454, 454 and 
464.
41 Stephan W Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP 2009) 364. See similarly 
Thomas W Wälde, ‘The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration’ in Philippe Kahn and Thomas W Wälde 
(eds), New Aspects of International Investment Law (Brill Nijhoff 2007). 
42 Patrick Carvalho, Investor-State Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Debunking the Myths (The Center for 
Independent Studies 2016) 20. 
43 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/16, Award (2 October 2006) para 423.
44 See for more on this narrative also Sattorova (n 37) 7 and Jason Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under 
Investment Treaties: A Legal and Economic Analysis (CUP 2014) 43. 
45 Suggestions that such survival-securing endeavour is at play can be found, for example, in Kate Miles, The 
Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital (CUP 2013) 
343-45 and Sattorova (n 37) 43-44. Whilst those involved with IIL can certainly be assumed to have an interest 
in the prolongation of the regime, explaining the focus on the rule of law as being purely oriented towards that 
interest would not seem to capture all the factors at play.  
9initially unforeseen jurisprudential developments, and understandings about the teleology of 
investment protection promoted in the academic writings – the ‘IIL-as-the-rule-of-law-
protector’ narrative has become widespread in jurisprudence and theory, sometimes with 
palpable effects on case outcomes and the employed legal reasoning. As such, this link 
between investment protection and the rule of law demands close attention in assessing the 
current and future operation of the regime, its reform, and its legitimacy in the eyes of 
different actors, with States as the nominal masters of the regime being in that sense 
particularly prominent. 
3.2. The Primary Role of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
The standard of ‘fair and equitable’ treatment has taken a central place in this nexus between 
the rule of law and IIL. It is described as ‘essentially concerned with the rule of law in 
international investment protection’,46 or as having the rule of law to provide ‘the unifying 
theory behind [it].’47 As much as the wording ‘fair and equitable’ seems to necessarily imply 
context-specific determinations, the standard ‘[n]evertheless … includes a number of 
fundamental principles inherent in the rule of law …’48
What does this mean in practice? In an oft-cited summary, Stephan Schill has identified 
how jurisprudence disaggregated the standard into seven sub-clusters of requirements, all of 
which ‘also figure prominently as sub-elements or expressions of the broader concept of the 
rule of law in domestic legal systems’:  
(1) the requirement of stability, predictability, and consistency of the legal framework; 
(2) the principle of legality; (3) the protection of legitimate expectations; (4) procedural 
due process and denial of justice; (5) substantive due process and protection against 
discrimination and arbitrariness; (6) transparency; and (7) the principle of 
reasonableness and proportionality.49
46 Nicolas Angelet, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(Online ed.) (March 2011), available at: http://mpepil.com, para 5. 
47 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (2010-2011) 43 NYUJIntlL&Pol 
43, 49.
48 Peter Behrens, ‘Towards the Constitutionalization of International Investment Protection’ (2007) 45 Arch 
Völkerrechts 153, 175. 
49 Stephan W Schill, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Public Law’ in Stephan 
W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 159-60 and 171. See 
similarly Behrens (n 48) 175. 
10
Numerous investment awards make more or less explicit, but nevertheless clear references 
to the embedded rule of law requirements. To stay with Schill’s delineation, host States are 
required to provide stability and consistency,50 respect domestic legality,51 provide 
procedural due process52 and behave transparently.53 These rules of law-oriented refinements 
of the FET standard have also been codified in some of the more recent investment treaties.54
This standard of protection has also taken the centre stage in very practical terms. It is 
present in the vast majority of existing IIAs,55 has emerged as the preeminent basis of claim 
by foreign investors56 and the one bringing most success to them.57 The FET standard and its 
sub-principles are very likely to be a central feature in virtually all existing and prospective 
investor-State disputes.58 It has thus emerged as a core concept of IIL with a potential to 
reach farthest into the regulatory sphere of States.59 Without disregarding the importance of 
other IIA provisions (primarily the prohibition of uncompensated expropriation), the FET 
standard is thus a prime candidate for examining the interplay between international 
investment protection and the rule of law issues. 
50 Often cited examples are CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 2005) para 274 (‘stable legal and business environment is an essential element’ of 
FET), followed almost ad verbatim in LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc 
.v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 October 2006) para 124. See 
similarly PSEG Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve 
Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/02/5, Award (19 January 2007) for a 
description of the unacceptable ‘roller-coaster’ of legislative changes (in para 250).  
51 An influential early case in that sense was Gami Investments, Inc. v The Government of the United Mexican 
States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (15 November 2004) para 91 (‘a government's failure to implement or abide 
by its own law in a manner adversely affecting a foreign investor may but will not necessarily lead to a 
violation’. Similarly, but more pointing towards potential bad faith abus de droit is Técnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed, S.A. v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (29 May 2003) para 154: 
host States must use ‘the legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the investment in 
conformity with the function usually assigned to such instruments’ and also Noble Ventures, Inc. v Romania, 
ICSID Case No ARB/01/11, Award (12 October 2005) para 178). See also similarly Alex Genin, Eastern Credit 
Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No ARB/99/2, Award (25 June 2001) para 
365.
52 See for example Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No ARB/05/16, Award (29 July 2008) for a conclusion that ‘a court procedure which 
does not comply with due process is in breach of the duty [to provide FET]’ (para 653). 
53 Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 
2000) para 99; Tecmed v Mexico (n 51) para 154; Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Partial Award (17 March 2006) para 309. 
54 See for example Article 8.10 (2) of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Trade Agreement (CETA), Consolidated 
CETA Text, published on September 26, 2014 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf> accessed on June 10, 2018. 
55 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 12) 130 and in particular authors cited in fn 2. 
56 Bonnitcha (n 44) 144; Dolzer and Schreuer (n 12) 130. 
57 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 12) 98, 101 and 130. 
58 ibid 133-34. 
59 Dolzer (n 40) 964; Schill ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (n 49) 151. 
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3.3. Everything Good on the Rule of Law Front?
To take stock so far – the rule of law is generally considered to be a good thing, and 
specifically so for attracting investment. Investment tribunals have understood and applied 
the preeminent investment protection standard as requiring the commonly understood rule of 
law precepts. In sum, one might say, investment tribunals not only claim that they are there to 
secure the rule of law, but also do it in practice and can derive the legitimacy of their 
operation therefrom.60 Even if increased FDI flows might not always follow, the rule of law 
‘mission’ itself can be sufficient to justify the continuation of the regime – especially with 
States often professing elsewhere their adherence to the rule of law at national and 
international levels. 
But the matters are inevitably more complex. The recourse to the appeal of the rule of law 
does not provide carte blanche to arbitrators, nor does it put ISDS decision-making beyond 
questioning. The jurisprudence of investment tribunals has helped to distil a remarkably 
opaque concept such as ‘fair and equitable’ into a series of less opaque, but still very general 
principles.61 Requiring that a host State acts ‘consistently’ or ‘transparently’ can offer more 
guidance than requiring ‘fairness’, but is still far from a rule (as opposed to a principle) and 
even farther from a case-specific and ex ante discoverable order on how State behaviour 
should have looked like. Rule of law-inspired or not, decisions by investment arbitrators 
remain contentious and prone to the exercise of considerable level of discretion. To clarify, 
for the purposes of the present article, the FET standard is understood as conceptually 
autonomous from the customary international minimum standard of treatment, despite their 
interlinkages. As much as the customary standard remains relevant for interpreting and 
applying at least some of the FET requirements,62 and sometimes the equality between them 
is expressly laid out,63 a considerable body of jurisprudence and literature suggests that FET 
has a life of its own and imposes obligations that go considerably beyond what the customary 
60 For an example of this narrative see Carvalho (n 42) 25 and more generally Paulsson ‘Enclaves of Justice’ (n 
14) 9-12. 
61 See similarly Vandevelde (n 47) 53-54. 
62 See generally Part II of Martins Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (OUP 2013). 
63 As in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Article 1105 and the subsequent NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/commission/ch11understanding_e.asp, accessed 10 December 2018). 
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minimum standard embodied.64 It is exactly the tendency towards ‘new thinking’65 in this 
sphere that also creates preconditions for the standard to play a more important role in 
domestic rule of law enhancement. 
To be sure, even the refined and disaggregated versions of the autonomously understood 
FET standard would tend to leave enough flexibility to accommodate for the myriad case-
specific factual scenarios that might arise.66 It is questionable if much can be different if the 
standard is expected to deal with immensely diverse (domestic) legal areas.67 As argued by 
Joseph Raz, flexibility is not in itself contrary to the rule of law - it is both inescapable and 
beneficial if reasonably used.68 As in (e.g.) domestic systems of judicial review, there needs 
to be sufficient discretion so to accommodate the specificities of individual cases.69
In normative terms, however, the (perhaps inevitable) acceptance of considerable 
decision-making discretion should result in the renewed and rigorous focus on how that same 
discretion is exercised. The employed legal reasoning/argumentative process becomes 
critical.70 As famously observed by Wendell Holmes, ‘general principles do not decide 
concrete cases’ – much of the key work must be done through case-by-case judgments to 
specify the abstraction at the point of application.71
At this point it becomes warranted to have a closer look at what paradigm of the rule of 
law the investment arbitrators are pursuing, most notably in how they approach the task of 
applying the distilled rule of law precepts, which rules and facts they refer to in the process, 
and what ultimate goal can be discerned behind the approach taken.72 This takes on special 
64 For a wealth of materials on this, see Paparinskis ‘The International Minimum Standard’ (n 63) 94-95 and in 
particular fns 254-58; as well as Dolzer and Schreuer (n 12) 130-42. 
65 ‘[p]ublic international law is inherently […] not about the rights of individuals against States. The investment 
treaty framework […] is […] a new development which requires new thinking.’ (Daniel Kalderimis, 
‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as Global Administrative Law: What This Might Mean in Practice’ in Chester 
Brown and Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in International Investment Law and Arbitration (CUP 2012) 145, 154). 
66 That is also the reason for common emphasis that ‘a judgment of what is fair and equitable depends on the 
circumstances of any particular case’ (Angelet (n 46) para 25 and similarly para 4). 
67 See on this diversity Dolzer and Schreuer (n 12) 288. 
68 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979) 222. See also 
generally Jowell (n 22) 5 and McCorquodale (n 14) 281-82. 
69 See in particular Peter Cane, Administrative Law (4th ed, OUP 2004) 185 and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 
‘Constitutional Interpretation’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajo (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 689, 693. 
70 See in that sense Jan M Smits, The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic (Edward Elgar 2012) 64 (‘[i]n 
law, it is not only (or even primarily) the result that counts, but it is the reason why this result was chosen that 
matters’). See also Bjorklund (n 5) 871-72. 
71 Cass R Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law’ (2007) 74 Social Research 1, 
11. 
72 Paradigm is here thus understood as defined by the Oxford dictionary – ‘A world view underlying the theories 
and methodology …’ (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/paradigm). In a similar sense, the concept of 
paradigms in IIL is present elsewhere, most notably in Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and 
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System’ (2013) 107 AJIL 45, where the investment regime is 
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relevance as the ‘reason for reasons’ in ISDS awards goes well beyond that in commercial 
arbitration and must take into account the unique position of investment tribunals.73
Especially in light of the ‘unprecedented responsibility’74 of ISDS arbitrators, it is the 
nature and quality of the reasoning in the award (as opposed to the mere outcome) that will 
frequently decide its ‘success’ in legitimacy terms.75 What should be expected is 
persuasiveness that goes beyond the rudimentary or formal fulfilment of the requirement for a 
decision to be ‘reasoned’.76 A broad range of interested entities, including both the host State 
population and those governing them, have a legitimate interest in a decision rendered with 
sufficiently detailed and persuasive reasoning.77 For some authors, facilitating the acceptance 
of the award by the broader audience becomes the key function of the tribunals’ decision-
making.78 What could then be the potential paradigms used to provide persuasiveness, garner 
acceptance and ultimately provide legitimacy to decision-making under the FET standard? 
4  International and National Rule of Law Paradigms 
4.1. Two Poles of the Spectrum
In abstract, it is possible to imagine two opposite paradigmatic approaches to how the rule of 
law precepts contained in the FET standard should be understood and applied.  
At one end of the spectrum is what is here termed the international rule of law (IROL) 
paradigm. At its core, it would mean that each of the FET standard requirements needs to be 
examined as potentially dominated by (inter alia) public international law or commercial arbitration paradigms.  
In the present article, the contrast of international and national rule of law paradigms focuses more narrowly on 
how specific sub-principles of the FET standard as an emanation of the rule of law are applied and what rule of 
law ‘world view’ guides such an exercise. 
73 Toby Landau, ‘Reasons for Reasons: The Tribunal's Duty in Investor-State Arbitration’ in Albert Jan van den 
Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 14 (Kluwer Law International 
2009); see similarly Kotuby and Sobota (n 40) 455-56. 
74 Landau (n 73) 188. 
75 ibid 187-88. See similarly Kotuby and Sobota (n 40) 455. 
76 As required, for example, in Article 48 (3) ICSID Convention and Article 34 (3) UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules 2010. See also on the formal obligation of providing reasons Federico Ortino, ‘Legal Reasoning of 
International Investment Tribunals: A Typology of Egregious Failures’ (2012) 3 JIDS 31, 35-38.  
77 Landau (n 73) 193-94 and 197. See similarly Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan W Schill, ‘Investor-State 
Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global 
Administrative Law’, IILJ Working Paper 2009/6, 43-44; Ortino ‘Legal Reasoning’ (n 76) 32; Marta Infantino, 
‘International Arbitral Awards’ Reasons: Surveying the State-of-the-Art in Commercial and Investment 
International Dispute Settlements’ (2014) 5 JIDS 175, 183; Bjorklund (n 5) 869. 
78 Infantino (n 77) 185; see similarly Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and W Michael Reisman, ‘How Well are 
Investment Awards Reasoned?’ in Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and W Michael Reisman (eds), The Reasons 
Requirement in International Investment Arbitration: Critical Case Studies (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 1, 29 and 
Ortino ‘Legal Reasoning’ (n 76) 32-33. 
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understood strictly as an international benchmark, completely and purposefully separate from 
whatever understandings of these same rule of law requirements might exist in the legal order 
of the host State in question. Therefore, the tribunals should enforce the international rule of 
law discipline, and should not be obliged to engage with the parallel rule of law concepts 
existing in the host State – especially as these might well be in some way deficient. The 
efforts should thus be put towards identifying and applying the specific requirements of, e.g., 
‘internationally-mandated level of consistency’ or ‘internationally-mandated due process’. 
After all, a global market requires global rules of the game for foreign investors. Of course, it 
remains open for discussion, and cannot be explored here in detail, whether this would then 
be a ‘truly’ international understanding or rather an ‘international investment’ understanding 
of the rule of law. The potential influence of other sources of international law equally 
binding on the host State remains an important topic in that sense. But for the purposes of this 
article, however, this is not the key issue. The critical questions is the difference from the 
other pole of potential understandings as to what the rule of law requirements might mean. 
On that other pole is what can be termed the national rule of law (NROL) paradigm. At 
least theoretically, in a particular legal situation which involves the foreign investor, each of 
the FET standard requirements can have meaning and content imbued by the national legal 
provisions such as constitutional norms, administrative codes, civil and criminal procedure 
statutes. This, in short, is how the host State in question would understand the meaning of and 
compliance with the same FET-prescribed rule of law requirements in its own legal order, but 
without taking the IIA itself into account. In that sense it would be the examination of the 
‘nationally-mandated level of transparency’ or the ‘nationally-understood legitimate 
expectations’. It is thus a form of negation of the global level playing field. Due process in 
France will be different from due process in China, despite these and practically all other 
States agreeing that due process is a key part of the rule of law, and should be obeyed as 
such. 
A further remark is in order. The paradigms introduced above are theoretical models, 
Weberian ‘ideal-types’ of a particular way of thinking about an issue. They are presented 
here for analytical and prescriptive purposes, but (as will also be revisited below) are unlikely 
to be found in pure form in ISDS jurisprudence. But this does not mean that investment 
arbitrators and academic commentators are not explicitly or implicitly leaning towards a 
dominance of a particular paradigm. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the IROL paradigm would 
seem to be dominant in that sense. 
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4.2. IROL Paradigm as a Logical Fit for the Investment Regime
At first glance it would seem that the IROL paradigm is perhaps the only logical fit for 
understanding and applying the FET standard requirements. To provide a summary of 
(interrelated) arguments in that direction, both the applicable law considerations and the 
underlying idea of detached protection standards point towards the IROL paradigm. Finally, 
and as hinted above, international rule of law promotion is already an important part of the 
existing IIL narrative. 
From the viewpoint of applicable law, there is a broad agreement in practice and theory 
that in deciding on the host State compliance with the IIA standards, including the FET 
standard, international law is the governing law. Zachary Douglas, in his rigorous 
systematisation of applicable laws in ISDS, summarizes thus: 
Rule 10: The law applicable to the issue of liability for a claim founded upon an 
investment treaty obligation is the investment treaty as supplemented by general 
international law.79
Most authors tend to analyse investment arbitration decision-making exclusively through 
the prism of public international law.80 This ‘analytical bias’ tends to stem from the often-
stressed quality of investment tribunals as public international law tribunals.81 This is hardly 
contentious as a starting point. IIAs are indeed international, State-to-State instruments 
governed by international law even if the treaty is silent on the applicable law provisions.82 If 
a claim is put forward that a treaty standard was breached, the claim is of an international 
nature and requires the application of international law,83 and in the first place the text of the 
IIA itself.84 As stated in strongest terms by Prosper Weil: 
79 Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (CUP 2009) 39. See in that sense MTD Equity 
Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment (21 
March 2007) para 74 (‘the lex causae […] based on a breach of the BIT is international law’) and also Ole 
Spiermann, ‘Applicable Law’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 90, 107. See also generally Monique Sasson, 
Substantive Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship between International Law and 
Municipal Law (2nd ed, Kluwer 2017) ch 2.
80 Florian Grisel, ‘The Sources of Foreign Investment Law’ in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge E 
Vinuales (eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (OUP 2014) 
213, 215. 
81 ibid 215 and 222. 
82 ADC v Hungary (n 43) para 290; LG& E v Argentina (n 49) para 85; Spiermann (n 79) 107; Cristoph 
Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd ed, CUP 2009) 578. 
83 See, above all, Hege E Kjos, Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration: The Interplay Between National 
and International Law (OUP 2013) 128. 
84 ibid 235; Spiermann (n 79) 107. See also in that sense W Michael Reisman and Mahnoush H Arsanjani, 
‘Applicable Law under the ICSID Convention: The Tortured History of the Interpretation of Article 42’ in Meg 
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… no matter how domestic law and international law are combined … international law 
always gains the upper hand and ultimately prevails. … The reference to the domestic 
law of the host State, even if designed only to ascertain whether it is, or is not, compatible 
with international law, is indeed a pointless exercise, the sole raison d'etre of which is to 
avoid offending the sensibilities of the host State.85
The formal superiority of international law points toward an ‘international’ understanding 
of the FET rule of law requirements. This further accords well with the both explicitly and 
implicitly expressed idea of investment protection standards serving as detached benchmarks 
of host State behaviour. What is ultimately the point of international protection if the vagaries 
of the domestic legal order cannot be avoided?86 As Schill notes, ‘[t]hat conduct that is legal 
under domestic law, suddenly becomes illegal under international law is the most normal of 
consequences the acceptance of, and submission to, international law by states can have.’87 In 
some ways, achieving the international rule of law while retaining a key role for national 
legal systems would seem almost as an oxymoron.  
The orientation towards the international (sometimes also dubbed supranational) rule of law 
is also clearly visible from IIL jurisprudence and literature. As noted also in the introduction, 
David Rivkin asserted with a specific reference to the FET standard that ‘[a]rbitrators have 
developed a supranational rule of law that has helped to create uniform standards for 
acceptable sovereign behavior.’88 On the topic of the (common) interplay between IIL and 
domestic administration, Rudolph Dolzer concludes that the effect of IIL is the (necessary 
and unavoidable) creation of ‘bubbles’ of separate administrative law for foreign investors. 
As he notes, the ‘impact […] on the domestic law of host states remains real; […] domestic 
rules applicable to foreign investors must be adjusted to accord with the obligations imposed 
by the international treaty’89 - with the FET standard being one of the provisions with the 
‘most severe impact on the domestic legal systems.’90 The adjustment of host State behaviour 
takes form in limiting, defining and narrowing administrative regulations to which foreign 
Kinnear and others (eds), Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID (Kluwer 2015) 
3–11. 
85 Prosper Weil, ‘The State, the Foreign Investor, and International Law: The No Longer Stormy Relationship of 
a Menage À Trois’ (2000) 15 ICSID Rev-FILJ 401, 409. 
86 See in that sense the call for building ‘enclaves of justice’ wherever possible in Paulsson ‘Enclaves of Justice’ 
(n 14) 9 and 12. 
87 Stephan W Schill, ‘In Defense of International Investment Law’ (2016) 7 EYIEL 309, 332. 
88 Rivkin (n 3) 328 (emphasis added). 
89 Dolzer (n 40) 955 (emphasis added). 
90 ibid 957-58. 
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investors are to be subjected,91 and is inherently indifferent to issues relating to the host State 
nationals.92 For other authors, the provisions such as the FET standard aspire to establish a 
‘system of international administrative law for foreign investment’93 or a ‘body of 
international rules of administrative law’.94
4.3. Should a ‘Logical Fit’ Entail Exclusivity?
The above does not mean that investment tribunals do not engage with domestic law or that 
they systematically ignore the domestic legal order. Leaving aside the situations beyond the 
scope of this article (such as jurisdictional issues of existence of a property right or illegality 
of an investment),95 investment tribunals have also examined and engaged with domestic law 
in interpreting and applying the FET standard.96 However, the extent of this engagement is 
unequal and there seems to be no clear normative agreement among the tribunals on the role 
and importance of domestic law.97 Jarrod Hepburn notes that: 
[…] cases such as Cargill, Sempra, and Enron have explicitly denied the relevance of 
domestic law at all in FET or arbitrariness analyses. Moreover, many cases involving 
claims of FET breach have not even addressed the question of the host state’s compliance 
with domestic law, thus implying that domestic legality is not relevant. However, […] 
tribunals in fact do often examine the domestic legality of the respondent state’s conduct. 
Certainly, domestic legality has not become an outcome-determinative feature in FET 
analyses […] [but] consideration of domestic law plays an important contributory role 
for tribunals attempting to give content to the often nebulous FET standard. […].98
But is this ‘mixed bag’ as concerning the relationship between domestic law and the FET 
requirements normatively acceptable? The insistence on the IROL paradigm when it comes 
to applying these requirements can put investment arbitrators in a relatively comfortable 
91 ibid 953. 
92 ibid 954. 
93 ibid 970. See similarly Kalderimis (n 65) 159. 
94 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 12) 24. See in that sense also the discussion of the relationship with Global 
Administrative Law in Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 121. 
95 See on these roles for national law above all Monique Sasson (n 79) and also Zachary Douglas, ‘The Plea of 
Illegality in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2014) 29 ICSID Rev-FILJ 155. 
96 See, above all, the recent thorough treatment of this issue in Jarrod Hepburn, Domestic Law in International 
Investment Arbitration (OUP 2017) 13-40. 
97 ibid 14-15 and 17 and materials cited there, in particular International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v 
The United Mexican States, Separate Opinion of Thomas Wälde (1 December 2005) paras 12 and 33 and Renta 
4 S.V.S.A and others v The Russian Federation, SCC No 24/2007, Award (20 July 2012) paras 21-23.  
98 Hepburn (n 96) 39-40 (references omitted). See somewhat similarly regarding expropriation ibid 58 and 67-
68. 
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position.99 The national law, in decision-making on the merits, is likely to feature only as a 
fact,100 leaving the tribunals with a rather free hand in according it the proper level of 
relevance. Investment arbitrators can thus avoid the potentially complicated discussions of 
how the host State administration/judiciary/legislature should have acted under national (rule 
of) law by conveniently falling back on their ‘international’ status – and the most likely rather 
high level of discretion that accompanies it.101 At the end of the day, it is the international 
vision of the rule of law, enforced in this case through IIL and ISDS, that is the ultimate 
arbiter of validity. If a State is unhappy with such a state of affairs, the argument often goes, 
there is always the prospect of ‘re-calibrating’ the IIAs, offering binding interpretations or, 
ultimately, exiting the regime.102
Such de lege ferenda arguments are not the topic nor the normative thrust of this article. 
Leaving aside attempts at ‘system-external’ reform,103 it is the argument made here that while 
in some situations the legal ‘isolation’ of foreign investors may indeed be necessary to 
protect them from the vicissitudes of domestic law and practice (and the FET standard allows 
this) as a more general normative orientation it leaves much to be desired.104 As argued in the 
next section, a conscious and thorough balancing between IROL and NROL paradigms – in 
the IIL as it stands now – is both possible and can lead to tangible legitimacy benefits. 
5 Towards the Complementarity of Paradigms  
5.1. The General Argument
Put briefly, imposing the international rule of law discipline on host States through the FET 
standard should be systematically complemented, to the extent possible, with the NROL 
paradigm. There should be a systematic normative orientation of investment arbitrators 
towards engaging with the relevant national law of the host State in determining not only 
99 See similarly Bjorklund (n 5) 871 concerning vague requirements for finding a denial of justice and the 
accompanying discretion of adjudicators. 
100 As noted, the fact-like character of municipal law builds on a long pedigree in international law (Grisel (n 
80) 222; see also Spiermann (n 79) 114-15 and Sasson (n 79) 1-7). 
101 See in that vein the criticism of the tribunal’s reasoning in Loewen v US (Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond 
L. Loewen v United States of America, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (26 June 2003)) by Bjorklund (n 
5) 870. 
102 See generally Charles N Brower and Sadie Blanchard, ‘From "Dealing in Virtue" to "Profiting from 
Injustice": The Case Against Re-Statification of Investment Dispute Settlement’ (2013) 10 TDM. 
103 ‘System-internal’ would refer to efforts of arbitrators to improve decision-making de lege lata, while 
‘system-external’ efforts would include de lege ferenda reforms by different stakeholders. See similarly Stephan 
W Schill, ‘The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within’ (2014) 11 TDM. 
104 See on this, for example, Hepburn (n 96) 195. 
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whether the requirement of ‘legality’ was complied with, but rather concerning all of the rule 
of law requirements embodied in the FET standard. In that sense, the tribunal’s discussion of 
whether the investor was treated in accordance with due process (procedural/substantive), 
transparently or arbitrarily should in every case, to the extent possible, involve an effort to 
determine what was the relevant national legal framework concerning these requirements and 
to what extent it has been complied with. In that sense, the argument I put forward also builds 
upon what has sometimes been termed ‘sequential review’ in denial of justice cases,105 but 
extends it as a more general normative orientation in interpreting and applying the FET 
standard. 
To be clear, the proposed engagement with national law does not mean that this law would 
become formally applicable nor that this assessment becomes determinative for finding a 
breach of the FET standard. It certainly remains valid that (as per, among others, Article 27 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)106 national law cannot justify a breach of 
an international obligation by the host State,107 nor is the non-compliance with national law 
per se an FET breach.108 The investment tribunals are also not to become the courts of 
appeal,109 and the IROL understanding of the FET standard requirements would thus 
certainly remain both a starting point and the ultimate fall-back option. But this does not 
mean that investment arbitrators should not identify, to the best of their power, what the State 
and its organs were obliged to do under the national ‘vision’ of the rule of law requirements 
embodied in the standard and how they lived up to these requirements. At the end of the day, 
there should be a need to persuasively justify why even the fact that national law was 
followed to the letter is not sufficient to avoid a finding of an FET breach, or to pinpoint the 
105 See in that sense generally Bjorklund (n 5), suggesting that international tribunals should in denial of justice 
cases first examine the lawfulness of the host State behaviour vis-à-vis its own law, before examining (if 
necessary) whether domestic law or practice departs from international law obligations. 
106 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331 (VCLT). 
107 See in the ISDS context Virtus C Igbokwe, ‘Determination, Interpretation and Application of Substantive 
Law in Foreign Investment Treaty Arbitrations’ (2006) 23 JIntlArb 267; Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York 
Convention, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 14 (Kluwer Law International 2009) 114-15 and materials cited 
therein. 
108 Schill ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (n 49) 163 and 167; Hepburn (n 96) 32-33 and materials cited therein; 
see also Sasson (n 79) 244 on general inability of domestic legality of an act to affect international (il)legality, 
but with a call to examine domestic law nevertheless.  
109 The explicit rejection of investment tribunals to play the role of ultimate appeal courts is often reiterated in 
jurisprudence. See for example Dan Cake v Hungary (n 7) para 117; Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen 
Baca v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/97/2, Award (1 November 1999) para 99; Mr. 
Franck Charles Arif v Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No ARB/11/23, Award (8 April 2013) paras 440-41. 
However, for skepticism whether tribunals can really avoid being appellate tribunals at least to some extent, see 
Bjorklund (n 5) 870. 
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deficiencies in the framework and/or application of the national law that (further) justify the 
finding of a breach. Of course, similar persuasiveness in the reverse direction is warranted 
when no breach is found, in this case the explanation being particularly relevant for the 
claimant investor.110
What are the main broader reasons for the investment arbitrators to leave their cosy IROL 
heights and bother with the domestic rule of law considerations? There are three primary 
ones that I address in the following subsections. Briefly, by doing so, the arbitrators 1) avoid 
the unacceptable disconnect between the legal framework of investor-State relations before 
and after the dispute arose, thereby better respecting the true expectations of the parties; 2) 
help tackle the vagueness of the FET sub-principles and enhance the persuasiveness of their 
findings, something particularly important in cases that can result in budget-crippling 
damages awards; and 3) can help identify, illuminate and hopefully (depending on the host 
State’s proactive attitude) rectify domestic rule of law deficiencies – thus also helping 
enhance the national rule of law more broadly and potentially benefitting the ultimate goal of 
domestic economic development. 
5.2. Preventing the Disconnect between the Expected Pre- and Post-Dispute Legal 
Frameworks 
The parties involved in an investment endeavour are certainly expected to know the law that 
will be applied to them, in accordance with the age-old maxim of ignorantia legis nocet. 
However, what law should the parties primarily be expected to know? Will an investor 
primarily consult the IIA on what to expect in legal terms when it comes to interaction with 
the host State, or rather the domestic laws in different relevant areas? Will the domestic 
official primarily have a look at the FET provision when confronted with a procedure 
involving a foreign investor, or the otherwise applicable domestic law?  
There are strong reasons to believe that the host States and investors primarily expect and 
plan that in their broader mutual relationship they will have to comply with domestic law; 
and that investment agreements – with the FET standard being here particularly prominent - 
are not expected to be the key instruments to secure the rule of law throughout the life of an 
investment. While duly accounting for potential overgeneralization, these expectations should 
still be given proper weight by investment tribunals. The tribunals should avoid deciding as if 
the host States and investors used or should have used the open-textured FET standard as a 
110 See also Bjorklund (n 5) 872 on the importance of persuasiveness for (unsuccessful) claimants. 
21
primary (let alone exclusive) guidepost for their behaviour. Such a presumption would not 
seem to correspond with reality.  
Before offering some empirical support for this claim, two remarks are in order. Firstly, 
from a formal viewpoint, it is true that at least the host State (as an IIA party) is expected to 
be aware of the existence of the FET standard obligation and its content, so the formal 
relevance of putting forward the reliance on domestic law is limited. Likewise, in many 
situations, the both the host State officials and foreign investors are certainly practically 
aware of these obligations as well.111 But this awareness alone detracts little from a 
suggesting that even in those situations the parties will likely first and foremost strive to 
comply with domestic law – if for nothing else then because the FET sub-principles are often 
simply too open-textured to provide tangible guidance. Secondly, expectations discussed here 
are not the same issue as the operation of the legitimate expectations doctrine, although they 
certainly affect this issue. What is at play is a broader question of the initial approach to the 
relevant legal framework in light of the actual or at least presumed expectations of the 
involved parties. The aim here is to make a more abstract normative point - one that deals 
with a common scenario where the FET standard protection becomes relevant ex post facto 
only.112
With that in mind, and although the empirical research is still far from being 
comprehensive, existing studies suggest that neither investors nor host State appear to ascribe 
the IIAs the main role in securing the rule of law or guiding their behaviour more generally. 
For a large number of foreign investors, the knowledge of rules, jurisprudence and even 
existence of IIL is not a priori a given.113 With the immense variety of foreign investors 
today, it would be rather optimistic to presume that all will have specialised legal assistance 
in this area, let alone to such a degree that investment protection becomes a predominant 
factor in assessing legal and/or political risks. But perhaps even more importantly, even when 
the knowledge about this protection exists, the belief in its ability to secure the rule of law is 
far from entrenched. 
111 See in that sense remarks of Mark Kantor in Ryan J Orr, ‘The Impact of BITs on FDI: Do Investors Now 
Ignore BITs?’ (2007) 2 TDM, 2. 
112 On this ex post relevance being common see the remarks of Krishan in Orr (n 111) 6 and also Wälde ‘The 
Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration’ (n 41) 64. 
113 See Jason W Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints 
from Alternative Evidence’ (2011) 51 VaJIntlL 397, 427 and particularly fn 125. See also Thomas W Wälde, 
‘International Arbitration in Oil, Gas and Energy’ in Lawrence W Newman and Richard D Hill (eds), Leading 
Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2nd ed, JurisNet 2008) 749, 758 (‘Investment protection 
perhaps should be high on the priority of the negotiators and drafters, both in government and with the investor, 
but it is often not the chief concern’). 
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For example, a survey of 602 MNCs operating worldwide,114 showed that about a quarter 
were not influenced by IIAs at all, nearly half saw their importance as limited and only 19% 
considered that IIAs influence their investment decision to a great extent.115 A more recent 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law/Hogan Lovells survey of 301 senior 
executives of multinational corporations focused on their investment decisions, and in 
particular the role of the rule of law in the process.116 It showed that 95% of respondents felt 
national laws were ‘essential’ (66% of respondents) or ‘very important’ (29% respondents) in 
securing rights, property and security. The BITs were still ranked high, but as the survey 
notes, the ‘intensity of feeling is lower’.117 Only 9% of respondents saw IIAs as ‘essential’.  
As concluded, ‘the treatment of investments by a host country’s national legal system
remain a key factor influencing FDI decisions.’118 Many companies invested in relevant 
markets even without IIAs in force (despite claiming they were ‘essential’)119 and actual 
research into IIA existence was far from a regular occurrence with determinative results.120
Somewhat relatedly, Jason Yackee investigated the attitude towards the IIAs of for-profit 
business consultants, political risk insurance providers and general counsel of large US 
corporations.121 Yackee concluded that evidence suggest that IIAs ‘do not meaningfully 
influence FDI decisions’,122 with responses from 75 general counsels from US Fortune 500 
companies indicating a ‘low level of familiarity with [IIAs], a pessimistic view of their ability 
to protect against adverse host state actions, and a low level of influence over FDI 
114 On this survey see in particular Matthew Shinkman, ‘The Investors’ View: Economic Opportunities Versus 
Political Risks in 2007-11’ in Laza Kekic and Karl P Sauvant (eds), World Investment Prospects to 2011: 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Political Risk (Economist Intelligence Unit/Columbia Program 
on International Investment 2007). 
115 ibid 96. 
116 BIICL (n 20). See also, however, remarks of Schill in Orr (n 111) 2 and 6-7 and Freya Baetens, 
‘Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection – A Response to Poulsen, Bonnitcha and Yackee’, CEPS Special 
Report No. 103 / March 2015, 3 on the need for caution in using multinational corporations as proxies for 
foreign investors generally. 
117 BIICL (n 20) 7. See relatedly UNCTAD ‘The Role of International Investment Agreements’ (n 32) 7-9. 
118 BIICL (n 20) 10 (emphasis added). Somewhat similar conclusions can also be derived from the survey of 96 
CEOs of affiliate firms seated in South Eastern Europe and CIS, where the predominant number confirmed that 
the enhanced legal environment, and domestic rule of law more broadly, were critical factors for their operation 
(see UNCTAD ‘The Role of International Investment Agreements’ (n 32) 13-14 for a summary). 
119 BIICL (n 20) 10. 
120 ibid. 
121 See Yackee ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment?’ (n 113) 399-400. 
122 ibid 400. 
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decisions.’123 In light of this, the ubiquitously present FET standard should be not necessarily 
be viewed as a primary rule of law-treatment guarantee in the eyes of foreign investors.124
Nor would the role and importance of investment protection more generally seem to be 
recognised in (at least some) of the host States. In a recent and most pointed examination of 
this topic,125 based primarily on empirical research in five countries, Mavluda Sattorova 
concludes that there exists a low awareness concerning investment protection obligations 
among relevant public officials even after State exposure to ISDS, and a generally low level 
of ‘learning’ from that exposure. With some limited positive exceptions, ‘the claim that 
international investment law purportedly transforms governance in host states is belied by the 
emerging evidence …’.126
IIL thus does not seem to be ‘the’ factor that host State decision makers and foreign 
investors turn to in their relationship, despite potentially costly consequences.127 And this is 
not necessarily surprising. Both the investor and the host State decision-makers would 
seemingly be expected to base their assessments of legal risks on the (considerably vague) 
principles and rules that would be applied in case that: a) there is a dispute; and b) that 
dispute escalates to the costly level of investment arbitration.128 It is not only problematic that 
in practice parties to any venture rarely anticipate that a dispute will arise.129 It is also 
doubtful that more ex ante interest and research will be put by an investor into a potentially 
applicable IIA and accompanying ISDS jurisprudence than into numerous other issues such 
as the expediency of administration, simplicity of procedures and general effectiveness of 
courts.130 As Hector Mairal poignantly observed, ‘between a government and private parties, 
123 ibid 429. 
124 For views that IIAs might be one of relevant factors, but not the factor in that sense see also UNCTAD ‘The 
Role of International Investment Agreements’ (n 32) i-xii; Omar E García-Bolívar, ‘Sovereignty vs. Investment 
Protection: Back to Calvo?’ (2009) 24 ICSID Rev-FILJ 464, 474 and Baetens (n 116) 2. 
125 Ch 3 of Sattorova (n 37). 
126 Sattorova (n 37) 101. 
127 See generally Wälde ‘International Arbitration in Oil, Gas and Energy’ (n 113). 
128 See in that sense remarks by several contributors in Orr (n 111) 2 and similarly Peter T Muchlinski, 
‘Towards a Coherent International Investment System: Key Issues in the Reform of International Investment 
Law’ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauvé (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World 
Trade Forum (CUP 2013) 411, 438. 
129 Similarly Michael E Schneider, ‘The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration: Introductory Remarks’ 
in Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo Polanco Lazo (eds), The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration (Brill 
Nijhoff 2015) 1, 4 noting that if the investors knew of the likely dispute they would most likely not invest at all. 
See also the remark of Metalclad owner (of Metalclad v Mexico fame), Mr Heller, that he would not have gone 
to law if he had known the meagre outcome (Orr (n 111) 12). 
130 See in that sense Salacuse (n 22) 386-87 and also Orr (n 111) 2 and 10. 
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respect for the expectations that arise from [IIAs] is but the ‘‘last step’’. In international 
investment cases this ‘‘last step’’ has been taken with great emphasis’.131
The complementarity of the FET and other provisions of the domestic rule of law 
processes thus needs to be taken seriously in normative and practical terms. As also 
recognized in the ICSID Convention preamble,132 investment disputes ‘would usually be 
subject to national legal processes’ – and ISDS is to be seen as appropriate only in some 
cases.133 Properly understood complementarity is what ought to feature in the legal reasoning 
process of the tribunals, not in the least if States in ISDS ‘should be presumed to expect and 
desire an objective and informed review of municipal law’.134 This expectation should be 
followed through. As Campbell McLachlan has noted:   
The function of the international law standards enshrined in investment treaties is not to 
replace host state law. Rather it is to provide the fundamental protections of international 
law, in cases where the host state legal system has failed to secure such protections 
itself.135
This last remark feeds well into another reason why thorough and systematic engagement 
with domestic (rule of) law should be a regular feature in FET decision-making. The rule of 
law protections already existing domestically, and the often-present richness of national law 
within which they are situated, should not be ignored in an overly rigid pursuance of a more 
abstract IROL ideal. They provide a potentially rich well of persuasive findings on 
(un)acceptability of a certain behaviour from the rule of law viewpoint – viewpoint 
presumably already internalized by the host State. 
5.3. Using the Richness of Domestic Law for a Persuasive Argumentation of Decisions 
To persuasively interpret and apply the rule of law requirements embodied in the FET 
standard, investment tribunals should relate their analysis to host State law. As much as it 
seems daunting to determine what (e.g.) ‘transparent’ means in the abstract, the task to apply 
131 Hector A Mairal, ‘Legitimate Expectations and Informal Administrative Representations’ in Stephan W 
Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 414, 450. 
132 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 
October 1966) 575 UNTS 159 (ICSID Convention). 
133 See also Schreuer and others (n 82) para 17. 
134 Paul B Stephan, ‘International Investment Law and Municipal Law: Substitutes or Complements?’ (2014) 9 
CMLJ 354, 371. 
135 McLachlan (n 107) 107 (emphasis added). See similarly on the general submission of foreign investors and 
investments to national law Sasson (n 79) 7 and 246-47. 
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such a requirement to concrete facts can be more persuasively grounded by taking into 
account the domestic provisions.  
Determining, for example, what specific transparency requirements host State 
administrators already faced in the municipal law can offer a fruitful starting point in 
persuasively shaping the tribunals’ ultimate decision. Was there, e.g., a requirement to inform 
the investor of a particular measure and to solicit its opinion? If there was, how was this 
followed through, if at all? To reiterate, even a finding that everything (or nothing) was done 
in accordance with national law might not in the end be determinative. But engaging with a 
relevant national provision can and should force the tribunal to be explicit in explaining what 
‘transparent’ would mean in a particular case and why, e.g., the fact that everything was done 
in accordance with domestic law did not prevent a breach. What is this IROL level that 
domestic legal system has failed to attain, if that is the case? By using domestic provisions 
and/or practice as a starting point for elaboration, what more would the international rule of 
law have required, if anything? 
This would also be in line with a normative understanding that not ‘anything goes’ – a 
principled right for autonomous shaping of the domestic (rule of) law cannot be an excuse for 
an unhindered fiat of the host State.136 As has been noted, the interpretation cannot both begin 
and end with just the domestic law considerations.137 There is, however, a strong case for 
ISDS decision-making to be exercised with caution, rigorousness and judicial ‘modesty’.138
The focus should thus be on trying to shape, to the extent possible,  the ‘international’ 
intervention in persuasive terms that can be understood and accepted by the host State 
through relating to its own pre-existing rule of law notions.139
Engaging with national law for these argumentative and persuasiveness-enhancing 
purposes is justified by domestic law’s usually and at least nominally higher level of detail 
and elaboration in comparison to IIL.140 The richness of national laws for the purposes of 
136 As noted by Jowell, ‘[a]cknowledgment that there may be different ways of achieving the rule of law does 
not, however, lead to the conclusion that the rule of law is an entirely relative and shifting concept and therefore 
may be readily excused by the standard of national convenience.’ ((n 22) 8). See similarly ADC v Hungary (n 
43) paras 423-24. 
137 Van Harten (n 38) 632-33. 
138 See for an appeal for more ‘modesty’ in ISDS decision making also Santiago Montt S, State Liability in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Hart 
2012) 22. 
139 This also accords with the understanding that host States are more likely to follow the rules which they 
‘internalized’ themselves and thus perceive as legitimate (Moshe Hirsch, ‘Compliance with Investment Treaties: 
When are States More Likely to Breach or Comply with Investment Treaties?’ in Christina Binder and others 
(eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP 2009) 
865, 873 and materials cited therein). 
140 See in this vein Bjorklund (n 5) 875-78. 
26
arbitral decision-making has been discussed, for example, by Jan Paulsson in an oft-cited 
piece.141 Paulsson notes that: 
[n]ational laws themselves contain corrective norms, and they may be formidable. An 
international court or tribunal charged with applying a national law has both the duty and 
the authority to apply it as a whole. If it does so, there may be no need to determine 
whether international law trumps national law. In this way a confrontation of legal orders 
is avoided.142
In practice, the legal system ‘in the books’ and the written constitution at its summit may 
be largely unrelated to the everyday exercise of power, as exemplified by what Paulsson calls 
the ‘lofty eloquence of the constitutions of banana republics of yore’.143 But this does not 
negate the possibility to use these domestic norms to ground the reasoning and enhance 
acceptability of investment awards. At the end of the day, it allows the arbitrators (in cases so 
deserving) to show the host State that it failed to abide even by its ‘own’ rules of the game, 
and that little ground is left for potentially blaming the final outcome on some abstract and 
hostile IIL ‘imposition’. 
Thus where a more detailed and ex ante predictable domestic law exists, there is little 
reason for tribunals to ignore it in their discussions.144 The FET provisions are certainly not 
the most developed set of commitments that oblige the host States to respect the rule of 
law.145 Combined obligations imposed upon the host State decision-makers beyond the IIAs 
are almost in every case likely to be more detailed and can often be followed with extensive 
accompanying jurisprudence and commentary.146 The promulgated form of domestic rule of 
law obligations is not usually problematic – as far as ‘law in books’ is concerned, it is hard to 
find a jurisdiction that does not seem to be strongly committed to the rule of law.147 It is the 
141 Jan Paulsson, ‘Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals’ (2008) 23 ICSID Rev-FILJ 215. 
142 ibid 215. 
143 ibid 219-20. See similarly Paulsson ‘Enclaves of Justice’ (n 14) 1, on ‘surrealistically gorgeous’ constitutions 
of dictatorial regimes. 
144 Hepburn (n 96) 56. 
145 As Echandi notes, ‘IIAs rarely include standards of treatment and protection that are not already provided by 
the host countries’ domestic laws and regulations at the time of the negotiation’ (Roberto Echandi, ‘What Do 
Developing Countries Expect from the International Investment Regime?’ in Jose E. Alvarez and others (eds), 
The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (OUP 2011) 4, 14). On the 
‘elusive’ character of trying to establish precise rule of law obligations in international law see Hepburn (n 96) 
56 (specifically on due process). 
146  See in that sense Watts (n 14) 16 (arguing that the domestic rule of law notions and mechanisms are far 
more developed than international ones in any case) as well as Tamanaha (n 12) 118-22 and Bjorklund (n 5) 861 
(on the regrettable lack of interaction of investment tribunals with rich resources found in human rights law). 
147 The need for clear laws that are fairly implemented on a consistent and predictable basis is almost universally 
present (Christopher Stephens, ‘The Rule of Law in Development’ in Jeffrey Jowell, J Christopher Thomas, Jan 
van Zyl Smit (eds), Rule of Law Symposium 2014: The Importance of the Rule of Law in Promoting 
Development (Singapore Academy of Law 2015) 29, 31). As Carvalho notes, ‘there is nothing in ISDS material 
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rule of law operation at the ‘most granular level of human affairs’ that is the crucial 
challenge, not the formal proclamation of the concept’s often supreme status.148
It is thus normatively questionable if the decision-making process can avoid ‘juxtaposing’ 
the FET sub-principles with at least some of the crucial commitments that bind the host State 
decision-makers in parallel. Such decision-making would also allow to temper the 
considerable normative and analytical problems arising if the investment tribunals must 
declare what the ‘good’ law should be.149 As Paul Stephan notes:  
[s]uperficially, investment treaties […] [specify] legal duties that host states have with 
regard to foreign investors. […] But all of them refer to the content of municipal law. 
Each invites a reviewing body […] to compare the host state’s behaviour to the legitimate 
expectations that its municipal law created. The enforcement of the international legal 
duty thus requires a review of municipal law.150
To return to Paulsson - in the end, the strong engagement with national law results in that 
‘the outcome is shown not to be an international imposition on national law, but a vibrant 
affirmation of that same law.’151 In the long run, in cases of governmental abuses, ‘even 
citizens of the country whose law is in question may come to see the international tribunal as 
a defender of enduring national values’.152 Directly referencing the FET standard, Paulsson 
concludes that:  
[…] one should have faith that a fully and judiciously motivated decision, reached after 
a painstaking ascertainment of the sources of national law, will be accepted by thoughtful 
nationals as wholly legitimate. If that is not so, why should one have higher hopes for 
perceptions of the way an international tribunal applies international norms, like “fair 
and equitable treatment,” which, in the view of detractors, are nebulous and therefore 
ultimately arbitrary?153
A thorough engagement with the domestic (rule of) law can thus both better respect the 
pre-dispute expectations of the parties and support the persuasiveness of the findings used to 
resolve the dispute itself. But the final reason for the normative desirability of such 
engagement has to do with the post-dispute stage in the host State. Investment arbitrators are 
in a somewhat unique position to provide the basis for a more permanent national rule of law 
protection that is nor covered – or should not be covered – by a civilised society respectful of the rule of law’ ((n 
42) 22). 
148 Stephens (n 147) 31. See also Salacuse (n 22) 391-92 and 395-96. 
149 See on this Calamita (n 11) 106 and more generally McCorquodale (n 14) 282. 
150 Stephan (n 134) 358. See somewhat similarly Kotuby and Sobota (n 40) 464. 
151 Paulsson ‘Unlawful Laws’ (n 141) 230. 
152 ibid 232. 
153 ibid. 
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enhancement – thus potentially helping attain the ultimate investment protection goal of 
economic development. 
5.4. Enhancing the National Rule of Law and Helping the Economic Development
An investment award elucidating the potential rule of law deficiencies in the host State also 
from the perspective of the national law itself can offer a foundation for pointed domestic 
reforms.154 These reforms, in turn, can not only help avoid future disputes, but also allow 
enhancing the rule of law surrounding for domestic businesses as well. The outcome of this 
enhancement, according inter alia to the economic literature on the topic, can be the 
realization of the host States’ aim of improved economic development. 
With their detached position from domestic political pressures, a powerful enforcement 
mechanism at their disposal, and an increasingly high profile of investment awards which can 
become focal points of public discussion, investment arbitrators may be uniquely positioned 
to elucidate the potential flaws and deficiencies in the national (rule of) law, including here 
laws, policies or practices. A more direct, narrower outcome can be a reform effort tailored 
towards avoiding future ISDS claims. UNCTAD noted that the increased number of 
arbitrations, almost always involving the FET standard, may motivate host States to ‘improve 
domestic administrative practices and laws in order to avoid future disputes.’155 There is also 
some empirical evidence of certain host States specifically improving their procedures so as 
to avoid disputes with foreign investors,156 although more research remains warranted. 
But a broader impact can result from the potentially identified rule of law deficiencies 
being rectified more generally and pro futuro. The factual matrix of the FET cases usually 
involves a legally domestic entity (even if foreign-owned) that is subject to domestic legal 
framework which is for almost all intents and purposes basically the same as for other 
domestic entities.157 It seems unlikely that a tribunal would have to deal with, e.g., separate 
insolvency,158 or banking159 regulation for foreign investors – with the resulting award being 
relevant just for this class of entities within the host State. While the decisions might be for 
154 See in that sense on the potential of awards to increase the ‘compliance pull’ Bjorklund (n 5) and Paulsson 
‘Enclaves of Justice’ (n 14) 11-12. 
155 UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (UNCTAD 2007) ix. 
156 Sattorova (n 37) 73-84. 
157 See in that sense Jorge E Viñuales, ‘Sources of International Investment Law: Conceptual Foundations of 
Unruly Practices’ in Samantha Besson and Jean d’Aspremont (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of 
International Law (OUP 2017) 1070, 1074. 
158 As for example in Dan Cake v Hungary (n 7) discussed below in section 6. 
159 As for example in Genin v Estonia (n 51). 
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the foreign investors’ ‘immediate benefit’,160 isolation of ISDS decision from the domestic 
rule of law issues is hardly possible,161 and the reform and modernization incentives coming 
out of the awards can often relate to the domestic legal system in general.162
This potential reform of rules and practices inspired by the (adequately reasoned) ISDS 
awards can therefore mean better rule of law for domestic entities as well. On one side, this is 
desirable due to the self-standing, intrinsic value of improving the rule of law in itself. But 
also, if the above-discussed presumptions of the improved rule of law leading to enhanced 
economic development (see section 2) are taken as a starting point, this reform can also help 
realise the ultimate goal of States in acceding to investment treaties in the first place.  
As much as improving the FDI influx can be important, it is ultimately not a value in 
itself, but a goal towards economic development. As is sometimes noted, ‘[s]tates seek to 
attract foreign investments because they are a means to promote, foster and finance the 
welfare of their people and their development’.163 Even if sometimes unarticulated, economic 
development remains the central rationale behind participating in the IIL regime,164 and has 
been ‘essential for the efforts to justify the creation of the modern system of investment 
protection through arbitral tribunals’.165 As stated in no uncertain terms in the leading ICSID 
Convention commentary, ‘[t]he Convention’s primary aim is the promotion of economic 
development.’166 The purpose of the investment treaties is ultimately host State’s 
prosperity,167 and IIL should thus ‘serve an objective beyond the optimisation of investment 
flows and profits …’168 A number of investment awards also exhibit the understanding that 
160 Ortino ‘The Investment Treaty System as Judicial Review’ (n 39) 439. 
161 David Schneiderman, ‘The Paranoid Style of Investment Lawyers and Arbitrators: Investment Law Norm 
Entrepreneurs and Their Critics’ in C.L. Lim (ed), Alternative Visions of the International Law on Foreign 
Investment (CUP 2016) 131, 151. See also August Reinisch, ‘The Rule of Law in International Investment 
Arbitration’ in Photini Pazartzis and others (eds), Reconceptualising the Rule of Law in Global Governance, 
Resources, Investment and Trade (Hart 2016) 291, 295. 
162 Dolzer (n 40) 971; Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer, ‘Preface’ in Peter Muchlinski, 
Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) v, vi-vii; Paulsson ‘Enclaves of Justice’ (n 14) 9 (on pragmatic focus on incremental lasting changes in a 
State) and 12 (on actual effects of NAFTA agreement on governance in Mexico). 
163 García-Bolívar ‘Sovereignty vs. Investment Protection’ (n 124) 473. See similarly Hepburn (n 96) 64 for 
whom the objectives of IIL extend to ‘encouraging the development of the host state, promoting respect for the 
rule of law, and increasing general welfare’. 
164 Omar E García-Bolívar, ‘Economic Development at the Core of the International Investment Regime’ in 
Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in International Investment Law and Arbitration (CUP 2012) 
586, 587. 
165 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Investment Treaty Law and the Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Challenges and 
Solutions’ (2015) 78 MLR 793, 809. See also similarly Landau (n 73) 200-01 and Kingsbury and Schill (n 77) 
20-21. 
166 Schreuer and others (n 82) para 11. See similarly García-Bolívar ‘Economic Development’ (n 164) 590-91. 
167 Ortino ‘The Investment Treaty System as Judicial Review’ (n 39) 443. 
168 Kleinheisterkamp (n 165) 811; see also Landau (n 73) 201. 
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foreign investment promotion is not ‘an end in itself’, but rather a stepping stone towards 
economic growth and development.169
All opportunities should thus be taken to help realize this ultimate goal. Achieving the rule 
of law deficiency identification  rectification  enhanced rule of law  improved 
economic development link can offer a considerable dose of added legitimacy and acceptance 
of awards that can otherwise be controversial in many ways. Of course, one should be aware 
of the limits of investment awards as domestic rule of law enhancers, even if investment 
arbitrators do approach their IROL and NROL complementation tasks seriously. For one, 
host State need to proactively respond to the identified problems, and readiness and capacity 
for that is something arbitrators can hardly affect. Secondly, investment disputes are 
(hopefully) not an everyday occurrence for host States and their overall impact on enhancing 
the rule of law might be in that sense limited - as opposed to, for example, thousands of cases 
a State might be facing before the European Court of Human Rights.170
The acknowledged practical limits do not mean that investment arbitrators should not put 
their efforts towards the complementation as described above. Recognition of this limits 
should help provide a more holistic perspective of the involved issues. Yet a different, and 
perhaps more important, question is how this thorough and systematic engagement might 
look like in practice? And is it actually feasible in terms of decision-making? To answer this, 
the following section discussed Dan Cake v Hungary award171 as a case study in how IROL 
and NROL complementation efforts can (and could) work. 
6  ‘It Works in Theory…’ – Dan Cake v Hungary as A Practical Feasibility Study 
Can investment arbitrators be expected to engage with and provide persuasive accounts of 
domestic legal orders? The question is perhaps best answered by an example from practice, in 
this case the award in Dan Cake v Hungary case. Dan Cake award essentially revolves 
around a procedural due process/denial of justice claim in the FET context, which is in many 
ways a core rule of law topic. It demonstrates a thorough and persuasive elaboration of the 
169 See for a summary Bonnitcha (n 44) 40 and in particular Saluka v Czech Republic (n 53) para 300 and Plama 
Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, Award (27 August 2008) para 167. 
170 Certain countries, such as Romania, Russia, Turkey and Italy each face several thousand applications, as 
visible from the most up-to-date figures (<https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=reports&c> accessed 
20 June 2018). 
171 Dan Cake v Hungary (n 7). 
31
domestic legal provisions, judicial practice and accompanying commentary. The Tribunal 
undisputedly starts and ends at the IROL understanding, and makes it clear that it is not to be 
seen as an appellate court. But this does not prevent it from providing a persuasive overview 
of the deficiencies occurring in the behaviour of the domestic court – from the viewpoint of 
the domestic system itself.  This not only persuasively grounds its findings on host State 
liability but can also provide palpable guidelines for potential rule of law enhancement.  
Before examining the award in more detail, it is worth situating it in the broader context of 
ISDS jurisprudence. Dan Cake is not representative of the heterogeneous and daily-growing 
ISDS jurisprudence as a whole, as it is questionable if any single award serve as that 
representative. But it is also not an outlier. It is an illustration of a strand of jurisprudence 
where engagement with the national legal framework has been thorough and in a number of 
ways along the NROL paradigm complementation lines. To this strand, it is possible to add 
the examples of awards in Urbaser v Argentina172 and Al Warraq v Indonesia173 as well as 
older decisions such as Maffezini v Spain,174 this last one demonstrating a strong engagement 
with both international and domestic commitments of Spain in the sphere of environmental 
protection. Different and contrasting examples certainly exist.175 The variety of approaches 
under essentially similar FET provisions indicates that opting for the NROL paradigm 
complementation ultimately remains a normative choice. 
6.1 Dan Cake - The Facts
The case arose out of the insolvency proceedings instituted against Danesita, a Hungarian 
confectionery manufacturer predominantly owned by a Portuguese company Dan Cake since 
1996.176 Danesita experienced fluctuating business fortunes, eventually resulting in a request 
for liquidation by its creditors on 7 August 2006.177 After Danesita failed to respond to the 
request in 8 days, its insolvency was presumed in accordance with the Hungarian insolvency 
law, and liquidation proceedings (including appointment of a liquidator) were put into 
172 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016). 
173 Hesham T. M. Al Warraq v Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976, Final Award (15 
December 2014). 
174 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, Award (13 November 2000). 
175 See in that sense, for example, the far more cursory assessment of similar rule of law topics as dealt with in 
Dan Cake in Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. v Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No 
ARB/11/24, Award (30 March 2015) paras 764-71, in addition to cases discussed by Hepburn (n 96) 33-34, 
some of which were already mentioned in section 4.3 above. 
176 Dan Cake v Hungary (n 7) para 2. 
177 ibid paras 38-39. 
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motion.178 An appeal process against this initial decision was unsuccessful on formal 
grounds.179
The key events occurred when Danesita attempted to exercise its right to convene a 
composition meeting of creditors in order to approve an agreement with the debtor.180
Despite the apparent inclusion of all the necessary documents, the Metropolitan Court of 
Budapest preliminarily denied Danesita’s request as ‘in its current form’ it was not suitable 
for distribution to the creditors and the convening of the meeting.181 Danesita was ordered to 
make several supplementary filings and the liquidator was encouraged to continue with the 
liquidation process.182 No appeal against this decision was possible.183 For a number of 
reasons, Danesita found it impossible to comply with the ordered filings and its assets were 
eventually sold, thus ending the existence of Dan Cake’s investment protected under the 1992 
Portugal-Hungary BIT.184
6.2 Tribunal’s Analysis and its Potential Impact 
While the Dan Cake’s claims – based on protection against expropriation, provision of full 
protection and security, FET and prohibition of unjust and discriminatory measures - were 
lodged against both the Court’s and liquidator’s behaviour, the latter’s actions were declared 
as not attributable to Hungary.185 This put the focus on the decision of the Metropolitan Court 
to order additional filings. In brief, Dan Cake argued that the court’s decision was without 
legal basis in Hungarian law, as Danesita provided the required documents and the meeting 
should have thus been convened.186 The eventual finding of liability resulted from the breach 
of the FET standard (through denial of justice) and due to a finding of unjust and 
discriminatory measures.187 To note, the Portugal-Hungary BIT has no specific provisions on 
applicable law for the investor-State disputes, and simply provides for arbitration under the 
ICSID Convention (thus implicating Article 42 of the said Convention).188 In accordance 
with the predominant understanding that was discussed in section 4.2 above, the Tribunal was 
178 ibid paras 40-41. 
179 ibid paras 42-44. 
180 ibid paras 46-49. 
181 ibid para 54. 
182 ibid. 
183 ibid para 55. 
184 ibid paras 59-62. The text of the BIT can be found at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1542, accessed 12 April 2018. 
185 ibid paras 158-60. 
186 ibid paras 82-84. 
187 ibid paras 146 and 161-62. 
188 See Article 8 of the Portugal-Hungary BIT (n 171). See generally on Article 42 Sasson (n 79) ch 2. 
33
not thus legally mandated to apply domestic law, nor necessarily engage with it in detail. And 
yet, the key interest here is the manner in which the Tribunal reached its conclusion, in 
particular the extensive engagement with the Metropolitan Court decision, Hungarian 
statutes, jurisprudence and academic commentary. 
As the Tribunal observed, the prompt convening of the composition meeting, provided all 
the statutory conditions were met, was of essence for Danesita.189 In order to ascertain the 
relevant sources in the domestic legal framework, the Tribunal examined the provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Act, its commentary and an opinion expressed in the Hungarian case law.190
In particular, while the Tribunal explicitly refused to pass judgment on the quality of the 
Hungarian insolvency law per se,191 it did discuss the potential justifications and implications 
of a particular Court practice.192
The most important aspect from the rule of law viewpoint is the Tribunals’ systematic and 
rigorous examination of the decision of the Metropolitan court. The Tribunal reiterated the 
oft-repeated position of ISDS tribunals that they are not to be seen as appellate tribunals, 
even in situations where the appeal to a particular decision was not possible.193 It then opted 
to examine if the decision was unfair or unequitable by establishing if ‘some of the 
requirements were obviously unnecessary or impossible to satisfy, or in breach of a 
fundamental right’194 and especially bearing in mind the complexity and urgency of the 
situation which involves the ongoing liquidation proceedings. The paragraphs of the Award 
that follow show that starting from a specific IROL standard of review is not incompatible 
with a thorough reasoning process that can strengthen the national rule of law.
The Tribunal began by quoting the decision of the Metropolitan court in its entirety,195
before again engaging with the Hungarian legislation (including the Civil Procedure Act) 
jurisprudence and doctrine to establish what sort of discretion the Court might have in 
ordering the additional documents.196 After recognizing that the Court might have a power to 
order additional, non-statutory mandated documents which are truly ‘necessary’,197 the key 
part of the Award then dissects in considerable detail each of the 7 requests for filing that 
have been ordered in the light of their necessity. This is done with references to the legal 
189 ibid paras 92-93. 
190 ibid paras 94-98. 
191 ibid para 82. 
192 ibid para 97. 
193 ibid para 117. 
194 ibid (emphasis in the original). 
195 ibid para 99. 
196 ibid paras 108-16. 
197 ibid paras 113 and 116. 
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framework, reasonableness and actual commercial and business reality – and with a 
conclusion that all these requests were unnecessary.198
While it is not warranted within the scope of this article to examine every paragraph, it is 
illustrative to quote a part of the Tribunal’s reasoning:
If the legislator had meant to grant the Court the power to refuse to convene the 
composition hearing on the basis of its assessment of the likelihood that the required 
percentages of favourable votes will be met, it would certainly have said so. On the 
contrary, it stated that upon the debtor’s request, the Court shall convene a composition 
hearing within 60 days. The Explanation on insolvency law makes it clear that “the 
settlement petition cannot be refused with a view to foreseeable/predictable shortcomings 
on the merit even if the experienced judge is well aware that the submitted material will 
not surely be suitable for concluding a composition agreement.” In addition, first, the 
time between the convening and the hearing may be used to convince some creditors to 
accept a proposal and second, a composition agreement is not the mere gathering of 
consents previously given: it involves a process of negotiations during the hearing and a 
vote at the end of it (see Section 41(5) of the Bankruptcy Act). The Court’s opinion as to 
the likelihood of success would therefore, at the stage of convening the hearing, be 
premature.199
Many similar paragraphs form a persuasive and thorough build-up to a conclusion that 
‘the Court simply did not want, for whatever reason, to do what was mandatory.’200 Such a 
conclusion led to host State liability for breaching the FET standard and the prohibition of 
unjust and discriminatory measures, with the damages to be determined subsequently.201
The decision makes the deficiencies of the Metropolitan Court’s actions clear, with 
thorough support by references to different domestic sources. Its reasoning can already 
provide the guidelines on how to reform the relevant aspects of the legislation and/or practice 
so to avoid further claims. In the context of the broader rule of law effects, a potential reform 
is unlikely to be limited just to foreign investors – a modification of the relevant aspects of 
insolvency law and practice is likely to be applied across the board and to benefit domestic 
198 ibid paras 118-42. 
199 ibid para 127 (emphasis in the original, references omitted). 
200 ibid para 142 (emphasis in the original). See similarly in the Sempra Energy International v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Award (28 September 2007) para 268: 
... the obligations and commitments which the Argentine Republic owed … were not observed. Whether 
the question is examined from the point of view of the Constitution, the Civil Code or Argentine 
administrative law, the conclusion is no different. Liability is the consequence of such a breach, and there 
is no legal excuse under the legislation that could justify the Government’s non-compliance since the 
very conditions set out by the legislation and the decisions of courts have not been met.  
201 Dan Cake v Hungary (n 7) paras 160-61. As of 10 December 2018, no decision on damages is publicly 
available. 
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actors as well. Bearing in mind the importance and frequency of insolvency proceedings 
generally, this potential enhancement would not be a niche improvement. 
7  Conclusion 
Securing and promoting the rule of law is a goal that not many would object to in principle. 
Even less so in the context of foreign investments, where investors might need every 
assurance they can get before venturing into countries where legal, political and social 
environments might be in many ways novel and/or volatile. As section 3 discussed in more 
detail, it is not thus surprising that securing that foreign investors have been treated in 
accordance with the rule of law has emerged as one of the primary teleological and 
justificatory narratives in IIL. Nor is it unexpected that the predominantly present and 
adjudicated standard of fair and equitable treatment has been interpreted and disaggregated to 
embody distinctly rule of law requirements such as consistency, non-arbitrariness, due 
process and transparency. But if the principled desirability and legitimacy-enhancing 
potential of such framing of IIL and the FET standard are less controversial, the devil still lies 
in the details. Going from ‘fair and equitable’ towards ‘non-arbitrary’ or ‘transparent’ is an 
important step, but certainly not the one that eliminates ample opportunities for different 
understandings of what is meant by these notions. 
As discussed in section 4, it is possible to distinguish between two paradigms of how to 
understand and apply the FET-based rule of law requirements. While the ‘international’ 
(IROL) paradigm, that predominates in the IIL discourse, would suggest an understanding 
detached from the one in the host State in question so as to preserve the international 
character and disciplining force of the FET standard, it carries with itself considerable 
challenges. Not in the least, investment arbitrators dealing with immensely divergent areas of 
legal regulation are in effect pressed to declare what international law would have to say 
about rule of law requirements in those context – and there might simply be little or nothing 
to refer to on the international plane. A discretion-laden effort to apply the said rule of law 
requirements could therefore end in apparently impressionistic findings that, in legitimacy 
terms, do not correlate well with their potentially severe financial outcome for the host State. 
Section 5 therefore put forward the normative case for complementing the IROL paradigm 
with an NROL one – the latter being how the FET-mandated requirements would be 
understood and complied with in the national legal order. Whilst the IROL understanding of 
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FET requirements would remain the start and end point, with domestic legality most likely 
not being determinative for establishing a breach, there are distinct benefits to this 
complementation. If the investment tribunals systematically and thoroughly engage with the 
domestic legal order and justify their findings also in relation to what extent host State did or 
did not follow its own ‘vision’ of the rule of law requirements this provides (at least) three 
concrete benefits. As discussed in more detail in section 5, it would prevent the primary 
expected pre-dispute legal framework – national one – from potentially becoming almost 
irrelevant in the substantive decision-making process; it would help enhance the 
persuasiveness of findings through grounding the findings of arbitrators on what was rule of 
law-compliant also by having recourse to the usually more detailed and already internalized 
understandings in the host State; and it would finally offer potential guidelines for rule of law 
reform, leading towards benefits for both foreign and domestic entities and eventually 
towards the possibility of enhanced economic development – the ultimate aim of 
participating in the IIL in the first place. 
IIL is a manifestation of a new type of international law that deeply intertwines with the 
national regulatory spheres. It can affect both the host State government apparatus and the 
individual entities to a largely unprecedented extent. It should thus require innovative 
thinking so its power can be harnessed in a way that is most beneficial for the widest range of 
actors. This article has presented one potential normative path in that direction. Other paths 
remain possible and worthy of exploration. But what inspired the proposals made here, and 
should steer the decision making of investment tribunals, is the recognition that ‘it is not too 
much to say that […] the role of international law is to reinforce, and on occasions to 
institute, the rule of law internally.’202 The possibilities for doing so lie open. 
202 Crawford (n 40) 8. 
